TRANSMITTAL	SLIP	19 a	m. Pr
TO:			
ROOM			-
<u> </u>			
REMARKS:			
	المداح		
1		The second secon	Principles.
1	and the same of th		
· ·	1,	NKR	21 /
/ M	1 Mark	, 11	
1 (le ECSTATE ECSTATE	82	
2	190		
7	Y •		Mark Control of the C
_		-	
State Dept. re	view comp	leted	
ROM: a/	NES	A	
\mathcal{N}		• •	

Approved For Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP84B00049R001303220026-8

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

82-4160

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 411-82 19 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion on Autonomy Negotiations with Deputy Assistant Secretary Claverius and National Security Council Geoffrey Kemp

- 1. Both men, who accompanied Secretary of State Haig on his recent trip to the Middle East, stated Haig came away from his recent trip to Egypt and Israel pessimistic about prospects for autonomy. He also apparently mistrusts Egyptian intentions to pursue the autonomy talks in a meaningful manner, and intends to urge the President to pressure Egyptian President Mubarak on this issue during his visit here.
- 2. There was no "give" in the Israeli position on the autonomy talks, with the exception of "narrow windows" given on two issues:
 - -- On the size of the Special Governing Authority, Begin commented he sticks to his proposed number of 15, but offered to consider any ideas Haig might have on this point. The Egyptians, of course, want something much larger.
 - -- On voting participation of Palestinians from East Jerusalem, Begin said he was "very determined to make an effort to solve this problem." He again reiterated the Israeli position they should not participate, however.
 - 3. General Sharon made several significant points, as follows:
 - -- He indicated the Israelis feel the size of military areas reserved for the Israeli army under the autonomy agreement should be sizeable, and include maneuver room rather than simply barracks. This contradicts the Egyptian assumption.
 - -- The continuing security role of the Israeli security forces, whether military or civilian, would continue in Sharon's definition to be widespread. This also contradicts the Egyptian and Palestinian conception, which envisages security responsibility largely reverting to local Arab police authorities.

This Memo is classified

SECRET
SECRET iApproved to Reclease 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP84B00049R00 be

DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER

2

- -- Sharon repeated what by now has become his traditional litary about mistrusting United States motives regarding Palestine, and so on. The Secretary apparently sharply informed him he had a "hang up", if that is what he believed.
- -- Privately, Sharon indicated he realizes that Begin had responded positively to President Reagan's letter to him regarding South Lebanon. In effect, he had promised not to undertake a large scale operation without a significant provocation. Sharon pointedly stated that plans for an operation were intact, however, and Claverius felt he was implying he desires to commence such an operation even without serious provocation. There may be a difference between Sharon and Begin on this issue.

4. Hai	g will be in Geneva on 26 January, and travel to the Middle Eas	t
	As of 18 January, he had not decided whether or not to visit	
	Foreign Minister Ali had suggested further conversations be	
reserved for	Mubarak's visit to Washington.	

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303220026-8 SECRET

DDI 411-82 19 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion on Autonomy Negotiations with Deputy Assistant

Secretary Claverius and National Security Council Geoffrey Kemp

Distribution:

1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - C/NIC
1 - D/NESA/DDI
1 - C/NE/DDO

25X1

1 - DDI Registry
1 - NIO/NESA

SECRET